- ［2017.11.23］BK21플러스, 분배정의센터 공동 개최 Seminar "Random Mechanism Design on Multidimensional Domains."
- Date2017-11-16 14:07:04
BK21플러스, 분배정의센터 공동 개최 세미나
"Random Mechanism Design on Multidimensional Domains."
일시 : 2017년 11월 23일 목요일 15:00-16:30
장소 : 16동 655호
발표 : Huaxia Zeng(Sun Yat-sen University)
We study random mechanism design in an environment where the set of alternatives has a Cartesian product structure. We first show that all generalized random dictatorships are strategy-proof on a minimally rich domain if and only if the domain is a top-separable domain. We next generalize the notion of connectedness (Monjardet, 2009) to establish a particular class of top-separable domains: connected+ domains, and show that in the class of minimally rich and connected+ domains, the multidimensional single-peakedness restriction is necessary and sufficient for the design of a flexible random social choice function that is unanimous and strategy-proof. Such a flexible function is distinct from generalized random dictatorships in that it allows for a systematic notion of compromise. Our characterization remains valid (under an additional hypothesis) for a problem of voting with constraints where not all alternatives are feasible (Barbera et al., 1997).
* 본 세미나는 BK21플러스관련 세미나 참석으로 인정되는 행사입니다.